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 “I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a King of infinite space...” 
William Shakespeare, Hamlet, II, 2  
“’The Aleph?’ I repeated. “Yes, the only place on earth where all places are — seen from 
every angle, each standing clear, without any confusion or blending.’” Jorge Luis Borges, 
The Aleph 
 
 Debates over what is fundamental implicitly assume that what is fundamental 
must be either a “top” level (roughly, the level inhabited by the biggest or most macro-
level thing or things), or a “bottom” level (roughly, the level inhabited by the smallest or 
most micro-level things).1 Here I sketch an alternative to top-ism and bottom-ism I call 
middleism, the view that a middle level is the most fundamental one, and argue for its 
plausibility.2 Though middleism has historical precedent, it has been distinctively out of 
fashion since the Enlightenment, and the view remains largely ignored in contemporary 
debates about fundamentality.  
 The goal of this paper is to put middle-ism back on the table. I formulate 
middleism in contemporary terms, arguing that the explanatory power of middleism is on 
par with that of top-ism and bottom-ism. Assuming a tight relationship between 
grounding and fundamentality, fundamentality of the middle level satisfies the desiderata 
of asymmetry, irreflexivity, transitivity, and well-foundedness of ground. I suggest that a 
version of middleism is uniquely situated to satisfy the Principle of Sufficient Reason, 
according to which everything that exists must have a reason, explanation, cause, or 
ground. Finally, I propose that the view might have some advantages over more 
traditional options.   
 I begin with a few caveats. First caveat: I myself am not a middleist. The primary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Terminological note: here I will use “bottom level” to refer to the smallest level rather than the 
ontologically bottom-most level, and “top level” to refer to the largest level rather than the ontologically 
upper-most level. 2	  As far as I can see, the only contemporary work directly espousing something like middleism is Inman 
(2017), a work that was published while I was writing this paper, and which has different motivations. 
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aim of this paper will not be to argue that middleism is better than its competitors, though 
I’ll say a few remarks about that later on. Rather, the goal will be to argue that middleism 
is at least as plausible a view as top-ism and bottom-ism, and that it should not be 
dismissed outright on intuitive, methodological, or metaphysical grounds. I simply aim to 
give middleism a seat at the table in the contemporary debate.  
 Second caveat: there are many intricate, subtle issues in the grounding and 
fundamentality literature. These issues include but are not limited to: how grounding is 
best characterized, how exactly grounding is related to fundamentality, what the 
grounding relata are, the modal import of grounding claims, whether grounding is a strict 
order, and how to distinguish partial grounds from full grounds. This paper will not delve 
into these very interesting and important specifics, even though they are relevant for our 
purposes if middleism succeeds. Rather, it will be my goal to lay the groundwork for a 
big picture middleist approach to grounding and fundamentality. I will go into enough 
detail to show that middleism is a contender, but I shall leave the technical details to 
another discussion.  
  
1. Preliminaries: Grounding and Fundamentality  
 
 Recently, metaphysicians have embraced grounding as the relationship of 
metaphysical explanation that binds together the more and less fundamental. According 
to various friends of grounding, brains ground minds, the micro grounds the macro, non-
moral facts ground moral facts, and generalizations ground their instances, to name a few 
applications. According to Schaffer: 
 
 “Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across 
 levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and 
 thereby backs a certain form of explanation.” (2012, p. 122)3 
 
For grounding proponents, grounding is to be viewed as synchronic interlevel 
metaphysical dependence akin to diachronic causation, connecting different layers of 
reality via explanation, lawful dependence, and modal necessitation. There is significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  It is a controversial matter whether grounding can be diachronic. I will assume here that it is, but see 
Bennett (2017) for a dissenting view. 
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controversy over whether grounding relates facts or material things. Since I do not take 
the plausibility of middleism to depend on a particular resolution to the controversy, I 
will not take a stand on the issue, and I will shift between fact talk and entity talk.  
 Grounding claims are often taken to have in virtue of structures, as in “x in virtue 
of y” or “the house exists in virtue of the existence of the beams”. Grounding is generally 
accepted to be asymmetric (x grounds y but not vice versa), irreflexive (x cannot ground 
itself), transitive (if x grounds y and y grounds z, x grounds z) and well-founded (x either 
is the bottom level of ground or has a most fundamental level of ground).  
 Closely linked with grounding is the notion of fundamentality. Fundamentality 
imposes a hierarchical structure on reality based on differential ontological dependence. 
The fundamentalia are such that “all God has to do” is make those things, and the rest of 
reality comes for free. Fundamentality theorists distinguish between the properties of 
absolute fundamentality, according to which its bearer depends on nothing for its 
existence, and relative fundamentality, according to which entities are more or less 
ontologically dependent relative to each other. Those who posit a most basic level from 
which all other things are derived often hold that such a level is absolutely ontologically 
independent. Other inter-level comparative dependence relations obtain above the most 
fundamental level. For example, it is common to hold that persons are more ontologically 
independent than cities in the same explanatory sequence, and that particles are more 
ontologically independent than the chair that they make up.  
 Together, grounding and fundamentality are intended to model reality as a dense, 
multi-level layer cake of sorts, with inter-level dependence relations imposing a 
unidirectional, hierarchical structure running from the most fundamental to the most 
derivative. Proponents of this approach can be further divided along several dimensions 
of controversy, each of which is relevant to the plausibility of middleism.  
 First, there is controversy over whether grounding is well-founded—roughly, 
whether reality terminates in an ultimate, ungrounded level or proceeds upwards or 
downwards without bound. Metaphysical foundationalists hold that reality is in some 
sense well-founded; anti-foundationalists hold that reality does not or might not have an 
ultimate foundation. 
 Second, there is controversy over what is fundamental and how many 
fundamentalia there are. According to monists, there is one fundamental thing. Existence 
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monists believe in the existence of only one thing; priority monists believe in only one 
fundamental thing. Existence pluralists believe in the existence of many things, and 
priority pluralists believe in many fundamental things. 
 Third, the comparative merits of monism and pluralism are intertwined with 
controversy over whether grounding chains terminate “upwardly” (i.e., with the Cosmos 
or the whole) or “downwardly” (i.e., at the objects or parts at the bottom-most level of 
reality). A common package of views bundled into priority monism takes the top-most 
whole, the Cosmos, to be the most fundamental level and to ground everything below it. 
Priority monism is situated against a package of views that takes the bottom-most things, 
often the material simples, to ground everything above them. Schaffer explains the 
division thusly: 
  
 “The monist holds that the whole is prior to its parts, and thus views the cosmos 
 as fundamental, with metaphysical explanation dangling downward from the One. 
 The pluralist holds that the parts are prior to their whole, and thus tends to 
 consider particles fundamental, with metaphysical explanation snaking upward 
 from the many. Just as the materialist and idealist debate which properties are 
 fundamental, so the monist and pluralist debate which objects are fundamental.” 
 (2010, p. 1) 
 
In the former case, all God must do is create one thing, the Cosmos, and everything else 
follows. In the latter case, all God must do is create the bottom-most things, the simples, 
and everything else follows. 
 Call top-ism the conjunction of the views that reality terminates upwardly, that the 
whole grounds the parts, and that the Cosmos grounds everything less fundamental. Call 
bottom-ism the conjunction of the views that reality terminates downwardly, that the parts 
ground the whole, and that the bottom-most level grounds everything less fundamental. 
Traditionally, these two views are thought to be the major options in logical space for 
proponents of grounding and fundamentality. Either the top level builds the rest of reality 
from the top down, or the bottom level builds reality from the ontological ground up. 
 Top-ists and bottom-ists compete for the most intuitive, parsimonious, and 
explanatorily powerful packages of views. The existence monist top-ist can deny the 
proper parthood relation and thus dodge tricky questions about how many fundamentalia 
there are and at what level they exist, but faces counterintuitive conclusions about what 
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there is (only one maximal thing, but not any computers or iPhones or coffee cups), 
whether and how it builds (if it can be said to build, it would build from the highest level, 
downward)4, and how the apparent homogeneity of the one thing represents the apparent 
heterogeneity of reality. The pluralist bottom-ist presents a picture of the world that 
accords with our intuitions about how reality is built, but faces significant explanatory 
burdens (exactly how many fundamentalia are there, and what are they?) and charges of 
ontological extravagance (there are that many fundamental things or that many derivative 
things?), among others. It is not my primary aim in this paper to argue against these 
views, so I will not discuss the matter further. I turn now to an alternative: a middle 
ground (as it were).  
 
2. The Middle Ground 
 
 Let the middle level be the level inhabited by medium-sized dry goods like 
iPhones, tables, and coffee cups, and call middleism the view that a middle level is the 
most fundamental.5 I will use the level of medium-sized dry goods as my exemplar, but I 
intend my arguments to apply to any non-top-most or non-bottom-most level. (Here I 
refer to “a” middle level rather than “the” middle level, as which middle level is 
fundamental might be controversial. More discussion of this point further on.) Though for 
terminological and conceptual ease I focus on a middle level as defined by its physical 
size, I take my arguments to apply, mutatis mutandis, to category-based levels like the 
biological level (which is generally taken to be “above” the chemical and physical levels 
but “below” the economic and psychological levels), or even to intermediate 
mereological levels above parts but below wholes. 
 Taking fundamentality to be absolute ontological independence, middleism takes 
those facts “below” and “above” the middle level, like facts about particles and galaxies, 
to depend on facts involving entities at the most fundamental middle level. A most 
fundamental middle level grounds all facts above it and all facts below it. A middle level 
is the most ontologically independent of all levels: all God has to do is create the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Since only one thing exists according to top-ist existence monism, there is a question about whether the 
cosmos builds upwardly or downardly at all. Thanks to a referee for pointing this out. 5	  Though I will focus on what it would be for a middle level to be the most fundamental, I take the view to 
apply to other middle-level entities such as theories, categories, logical operators, truths, laws, etc. 
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fundamental middle level of reality, and the existence of the bottom-most levels and the 
upper-most levels comes for free. Viewing reality through the fundamentality glasses, as 
we move our gaze upon reality from the bottom-most to the top-most level, we see some 
least fundamental things (the particles), proceed to the most fundamental things (the 
medium-sized dry goods), and then finally to more least fundamental things (the top-most 
thing or things).6 
 Such a world is logically, conceptually, and metaphysically possible. Neither 
definitions of fundamentality nor definitions of grounding require ontological primacy of 
a top-most or bottom-most level. That there is possible world in which the fundamentalia 
are medium-sized things is ideally conceivable in Chalmers’ sense: to the extent that 
fundamentality relations are imaginatively accessible, it appears to be no greater a 
difficulty to positively conceive a middleist world than it is to positively conceive of the 
alternatives--which no one appears to believe we have difficulty positively conceiving. 
One can easily imagine a world exactly like ours in which God thinks “I don’t feel like 
making the small things in order to create the big things today. Rather, I prefer to create 
every single medium level thing. I will make every iPhone, couch, human, toaster (etc.), 
and from those things, the bottom-most particles and the top-most thing will arise.” 
Whether or not our world is a middleist one, the coherence and possibility of middleism 
should shed doubt on top-ist and bottom-ist dogma, as well as the modal necessity of top-
ist and bottom-ist claims. 
 Middleism has past and contemporary historical precedent. The ontological 
primacy of Aristotelian substances and modes, rather than basic particles or cosmoi, is a 
forerunner to middleism.7 Heidegger’s ontologically basic “ready-to-hand” objects 
(roughly, tools and things of value) speak of middleist sympathies. Van Inwagen’s 
famous contention that the only composites are living organisms is a de facto 
commitment to the idea that only middle-level living things like cells can compose bigger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Though I am assuming this sort of structure for ease of argument,	  comparative fundamentality of levels 
need not be structured in this exact way. For example, a more exotic version of middleism holds that the 
least fundamental level is something half-way between the middle and the top-most level. Thanks to a 
referee for pointing this out. 7	  On Aristotle as a forerunner to priority monism, Schaffer (2013) writes: “For Aristotle, substances are 
fundamental, and without them ‘it would be  impossible for any of the other things to exist’ (1984a, p. 5; cf. 
Spinoza 1994, p.  85). Aristotle likewise views substances as integrated, being ‘that which is compounded 
out of something so that the whole is one—not like a heap, but like a syllable ...’ (1984c, p. 1644).” 
Such an interpretation is just as easily viewed as a kind of middleism as it is a kind of priority monism. 
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middle-level things like people.8 Merricks’ mereological nihilism, according to which 
there are only conscious beings and tiny microphysical bits, can be interpreted as a hybrid 
form of middleism.9 Korman’s commonsense metaphysics methodologically supports the 
ontological primacy of perceptually available everyday objects.10 Giberman argues that 
certain spatiotemporally extended, mereologically complex, topologically connected 
concreta are among the fundamental, while still being proper parts of the whole cosmos.11 
And Inman’s middleist mereology, which I discovered while producing this paper and 
with which I share great sympathy, posits middle-level essences of familiar objects as the 
fundamental things and thereby proposes to solve the problems of material composition 
and constitution.12 
 There are more scientific and metaphysical views with middleist sympathies than 
one might think. Spatially distinct galaxies that are not parts of each other’s light cones, 
from which and upon which everything depends, exemplify middleist ontology. Classic 
quantum mechanics accepts entangled systems, the major understanding of which takes 
them to determine states below them and above them. It is not implausible to think that 
the biological level grounds the chemical and physical levels below it and the 
psychological and economic levels above it. Mereologists who accept extended simples 
back a kind of middleism according to which extended simples ground qualitative 
variation within the simples and ground facts about the simples themselves. 
 With this warm-up in mind, we can tend to the details of middleism more 
formally. I take the most general version of middleism to be the conjunction of the 
following views: 
 
 (Middle Fundamentality) An absolutely ontologically independent middle level 
 is the most fundamental level. 
 
 (Middle Grounding) All facts obtain in virtue of middle-level facts. 
 
Optionally, a middleist can hold: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  See van Inwagen (1990). 9	  See Merricks (2001). 10	  See Korman (2015). 11	  See Giberman (2015). 12	  See Inman (2017). 
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 (Metaphysical Foundationalism) Reality terminates at a fundamental middle 
 level. 
 
Foundationalism is optional for the middleist because she might hold that reality iterates 
inwardly towards the middle without bound. (I discuss this option in detail further 
below.) On to a bit of explanation and articulation of each principle. 
  Middle Fundamentality is a thesis about the type of ontological independence 
exhibited by the middle level, and a claim of comparative fundamentality about levels 
above and below it. According to Middle Fundamentality, the building blocks of reality 
inhabit a middle level. Middle Fundamentality can be further divided into pluralist and 
monist versions. Pluralist middle fundamentality takes there to be numerous 
fundamentalia at the middle level. Monist middle fundamentality takes there to be a 
single fundamental thing at the middle level (the übermiddle?) that grounds all else. In 
the rest of the discussion, I will assume pluralist middle fundamentality, as I take it to be 
less exotic than monist middle fundamentality. 
 That the middle level builds the other levels might seem to be a reductio of the 
view at first glance. We have strong intuitions about the directions of building and 
dependence, and they are difficult to square with the idea that medium-sized dry goods 
are the ultimate grounds and the basic builders. The thought is that “upward” building is 
intuitively palatable: as our childhood intuitions based on Legos suggest, the littler things 
build the bigger things. And some can even be talked into the idea that “downward” 
building is intuitively acceptable: perhaps the whole can build its parts, as when a human 
body unites a group of living cells and organs. But how can the middle level do both of 
these jobs? I respond offensively: Middleism can be no more counterintuitive than top-
ism or bottom-ism on the basis of building directionality, since it is committed to both 
upward and downward building.13 Anti-middleist intuitions are shared by those who find 
priority monism implausible due to its commitment to “downward” rather than “upward” 
building, but are no worse than those had by priority monism alone. 
 Middle Grounding holds that the middle level is or contains the ungrounded 
grounding facts, and all other facts are derivative. In the lingua franca of the grounding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  If one finds building in either direction counterintuitive, then middleism will be doubly counterintuitive. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend the intuitiveness of building more generally. 
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literature, all facts obtain in virtue of Middle Facts. Fundamental grounding claims take 
the form “x obtains in virtue of y”, where y is a fact about some middle-level 
fundamental entity. If Middle Grounding is true, then facts about chairs, iPhones, tables, 
and humans ground facts about cells and about galaxies. 
 Middle Grounding satisfies logical desiderata for a theory of ground. Middle 
Grounding is asymmetric: facts at the middle level ground facts at levels lower than theirs 
and levels higher than theirs but not vice-versa. Middle Grounding is irreflexive: middle-
level facts don’t ground themselves. And Middle Grounding is transitive: if fact x 
grounds fact y and fact y grounds fact z, fact x grounds fact z.  
 A bit of explanation on the latter point. Unidirectionality of the grounding relation 
plays a central role in securing transitivity of ground in top-ist and bottom-ist approaches. 
In cruder terms, all the “more fundamental than” arrows point up or point down. Thus the 
fact that the particles are arranged in a particular way “upwardly” grounds the fact that 
the house exists, and the fact that the house exists “upwardly” (and partially) grounds the 
fact that the cosmos contains exactly what it does. Middle Grounding, in contrast, is 
committed to the bidirectionality of ground: the middle grounds downwardly and 
upwardly. Prima facie, this seems to pose a problem for the transitivity of ground: how 
can grounding be transitive if the particles don’t ground the Cosmos (or vice-versa)?  
 The answer, according to Middle Grounding, is that the particles don’t ground the 
Cosmos. Transitivity of grounding is preserved upwardly from middle facts and 
downwardly from middle facts, but not unidirectionally across all levels. For example, 
the fact that the house exists grounds the fact that the particles exist, and the fact that the 
house exists (partially) grounds the fact that the Cosmos exists, but the fact that the 
particles exist does not (partially) ground the fact that the Cosmos exists. Transitivity 
does not require that the arrows of ground homogenously face the same direction. 
 A final note on Middle Grounding: one need not accept it in order to hold a 
middleist conception of the world. One might believe in a distinction between the 
fundamental and the derivative without believing in a substantive notion of ground. 
According to this more minimal middleism, the middle level is the most fundamental 
one, other levels are ontologically derived from the middle level, and presumably various 
other sorts of non-grounding dependence relations obtain between levels. Wilson’s 
(2014) form of grounding skepticism, according to which there are many little-g 
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grounding relations (determinate/ determinable, realization, composition, constitution) 
but not a single big G Grounding relation that unites them, is compatible with Middle 
Fundamentality.14  
 With respect to metaphysical foundationalism, the middleist has several options 
open to her. She might opt to accept metaphysical foundationalism, suspecting that it is 
neither conceptually nor metaphysically coherent for reality to iterate interminably into a 
middle level. In contrast, it is at least conceptually coherent that reality infinitely 
descends or ascends without bound. Although there is controversy on this point, well-
foundedness is widely taken to be a desideratum for theories of grounding and 
fundamentality. The thought is that whatever is grounded inherits its reality from its 
grounds, and the source of the inheritance must begin somewhere.15 Rabin and Rabern 
(2016) distinguish between well-founded in the sense of “bounded from below” and well-
founded in the sense of “has a foundation”. By definition, middleism cannot satisfy the 
first type, since the view itself constitutes a challenge to the fundamentality of the bottom 
level. But it certainly comports with the idea that reality has a foundation, since lower-
level things like particles and highest-level things like planets inherit their existence from 
middle-level things like iPhones and toasters and neighborhoods.   
 The middleist need not be a metaphysical foundationalist, however. She might try 
to make sense of a reality that iterates into the middle level without bound.16 Making use 
of the notion of relative fundamentality, this sort of middleist asserts that each level 
closer to the middle level is more fundamental than the last. Anti-foundationalist and 
foundationalist middleism share major traits: with both, viewing the world through 
fundamentality goggles yields a view of the world with the least fundamental entities at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  In separate work, Wilson argues that determinables are more fundamental than determinates, a view 
friendly to middleist claims. 15	  Schaffer (2016) writes: “One cannot be rich merely by having a limitless sequence of debtors, each 
borrowing from the one before. There must actually be a source of money somewhere. Likewise something 
cannot be real merely by having a limitless sequence of ancestors, each claiming reality from its parents. 
There must actually be a source of reality somewhere.”	  16	  In correspondence, Alex Skiles gives the following example: Suppose that x is more fundamental than y 
iff x has a diameter closer to n inches than the diameter of y. Then we can conceive of a world in which 
there are (i) spherical objects of n - 1 inches diameter, n - 1/2 inches diameter, n - 1/4 inches diameter, and 
so on; (ii) spherical objects of n + 1 inches diameter, n + 1/2 inches diameter, n + 1/4 inches diameter, and 
so on; and (iii) no other objects. In such a world, middleism is true in the sense that the more towards the 
middle we go the more fundamental we go, yet there is no most foundational middle level owing to a 
Xeno’s paradox-type situation.  
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the bottom, the most fundamental things at the middle, and more least fundamental 
entities at the top. They diverge with respect to the relative versus absolute 
fundamentality of the middle level.  
 
3. Objections to Middleism 
 
 Like other prima facie implausible metaphysical views (ontological pluralism, 
mereological nihilism, and existence monism, to name a few), middleism is best 
illuminated by defense against objections. Here I’ll articulate and discuss a few of the 
most obvious ones. 
 The first objection is that a middle level is not suited to be the most fundamental 
just because it cannot structure reality unidirectionally. According to top-ism and bottom-
ism, reality is built with dependence relation upon dependence relation, with degrees of 
fundamentality increasing or decreasing upwards or downwards. Facts about houses 
depend on facts about particles. Facts about neighborhoods depend on facts about houses. 
Or: biological facts depend on chemical facts. Psychological facts depend on biological 
facts. But such a hierarchically ordered dependence picture is not available to the 
middleist.  
 I respond: what is important about fundamentality as a metaphysical tool is the 
structure it imposes on reality, not the unidirectionality of such structure. Dependence 
relations impose ontological order, but not necessarily the uniform direction of such 
relations. It is not as if Reality is literally built layer upon layer, like a very tall and wide 
skyscraper, with the dependence facts arising from these layers. Rather, it is the collective 
interlevel dependencies, whichever way they face and however they are layered, that 
impose ontological structure. Arguably, interlevel dependencies are all we need to create 
the familiar multi-tiered structure of reality. We do not require unidirectionality all the 
way through. 
  A related objection holds that middleism violates the spirit of ground as an 
analogue of causation. Though I am not a fan of the grounding-causation analogy17, 
suppose that grounding is “metaphysical causation”, on account of their mutual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See Bernstein (2016) for some grumpy arguments against the causation/grounding analogy. 
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involvement in determination, lawful necessity, and explanation. Then, the objection 
goes, a middle level is not suited to be most fundamental because intermediate causes are 
not suitable to count as sources of bidirectional causal explanation. Events are to be 
causally explained in terms of their dependence on past events, but they are not to be 
causally explained in terms of their dependence on past events and future events. 
 I respond that causation is in fact well-suited to bidirectional explanation. If 
backwards explanation is coherent, events can be explained in terms of their antecedents 
and their consequents. Consider an example of backwards explanation from Jenkins and 
Nolan (2008): a planet slows down when it is about to reach its apogee. A later event, the 
planet’s imminent meeting with its apogee, explains an earlier event, the planet’s slowing 
down. The direction of explanation can be expanded to include a later event—for 
example, the planet’s particular position as it meets the apogee. Here, a single event (the 
planet’s imminent meeting with its apogee) explains a past event (the planet’s slowing 
down) and a future event (the planet’s particular position). Similar examples of 
explanatory bidirectionality can be generated. 
 Another objector might hold that middleism is irredeemably arbitrary: whereas 
bottom-ism and top-ism apparently come with reasons that the top level or the bottom 
level is fundamental, in virtue of what is a particular middle level more fundamental than 
other middle levels? The objection can be understood in two more specific ways. The 
first way holds that there is no plausible metaphysical underpinning for the 
fundamentality of the middle level. The second way holds that there is no justification for 
believing that a particular middle level is the fundamental one. 
  To both versions of the objection, I respond: what makes a middle level a most 
fundamental one is just that it builds the other levels. Further explanation isn’t needed, 
and top-ist and bottom-ist approaches do not offer one. How satisfying this response is 
depends on the answer to a central question in the grounding literature: whether 
grounding facts themselves have grounds (and in particular, whether fundamental 
grounding facts, those facts containing at least one fundamental relatum, are further 
grounded). If fundamental grounding facts are grounded, then what makes the middle 
level fundamental is grounded in some further fact—just like it would be for the top-ist or 
bottom-ist with the same commitments. If fundamentality facts are ungrounded, then 
what makes the middle level fundamental is primitive—just like it would be for top-ists 
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and bottom-ists with primitivist commitments. Either way, the middleist isn’t worse off 
than her competitors with respect to why a particular level, rather than another, is 
fundamental.  
 A cluster of objections to middleism centers on the size of the most fundamental 
level. The Size of the Middle Objector says: look, I know how big the smallest level is. 
It’s just the one inhabited by the smallest, most ontologically basic things. And I know 
how big the biggest level is: it’s just the one such that nothing is bigger. I even know how 
big the chemical level is and how big the biological level is. But I don’t know how big 
the most fundamental middle level is: I don’t know where to draw the lines. Why houses 
but not planets? Why wooden planks but not houses? We need principles for sorting what 
is fundamental and what isn’t. Size is gradable, and doesn’t offer the clean distinctions 
required for a metaphysics of fundamentality. 
 I respond: size itself doesn’t matter to fundamentality. Calling the middle level 
fundamental is no more mysterious than calling the bottom-most or top-most levels 
fundamental. That principles for distinguishing the fundamental from the nonfundamental 
are not easy to come by isn’t a mark against its plausibility. Nor is such difficulty unique 
to middleism. Much of the literature struggles with what to call fundamental even within 
top-ist and bottom-ist frameworks, especially with respect to whether and how many 
derivative entities are to be included in the Existence Club. And while I remain neutral on 
the “Do the grounds have grounds?” question, if being fundamental is itself a 
fundamental fact, no further answer is needed in any case. 
 A second, related objection holds that fundamentality simply doesn’t track size. 
Holly Andersen (private correspondence) puts this point nicely:  
 
 “It may be that physical size scale turns out to be a quite uninteresting and 
 minimally explanatory part of the world, and that the relevant levels for 
 fundamentality simply don’t correspond in any interesting way with physical size 
 scale levels.” 
 
Call this objection Size Doesn’t Matter.18  
 I respond: physical size need not be the dimension of fundamentality in order for 
middleism to be a live option. In my discussion, I have focused on physical size because 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Thanks to Holly Andersen for developing this objection. 
	   14	  
it accurately reflects the background assumptions of the grounding and fundamentality 
literature. But take any other independent ordering one prefers, whether it be most 
conscious to least conscious, most loved by God to least loved by God, most in the past 
to most in the future, etc., and stipulate that there is a middle part of that ordering which 
is most fundamental. The spirit of middleism requires only that a middle level be 
fundamental, not that the middle level be defined in terms of size. As far as I can see, my 
remarks apply to any conception of the middle level. 
 The final worry I will articulate and address focuses on the inferential and 
predictive power of the middle level. One instrumentally valuable feature of the 
grounding and fundamentality worldview is that we should, in principle, be able to 
predict and infer what exists from the fundamentalia. Given the existence and 
arrangement of the most ontologically basic simples, the argument goes, we should be 
able to infer what else exists. This imaginative exercise seems easy to achieve for 
bottom-ists, for whom reality is built out of the smallest basic things, and easy to imagine 
for top-ists, who simply have to infer what exists by looking at the features of the 
uppermost whole. Does the middleist have the same options available? Yes. From the 
maximal panoply of middle-level things, we can infer what exists at the bottom-most and 
top-most levels, and presumably infer why those things exist and how they behave. There 
is no explanatory inference strategy available to the top-ist and bottom-ist that is not 
available to the middleist. A middle level is just as inferentially and predictively useful as 
a largest or smallest level. 
 
Objection: minimality constraints 
 
4.0 Advantages of Middleism 
 
 Thus far I have focused on making middleism plausible and staving off the most 
obvious objections. I will now suggest that middleism has some advantages over top-ism 
and bottom-ism, but I leave full-throated arguments in its favor for another discussion. 
 Middleism secures the existence and explanatory power of perceptually available 
ordinary objects. Bottom-ists struggle to justify the existence and explanatory force of 
such objects, since the itty bitty ontologically basic things are supposed to be doing the 
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major explanatory work. And monist top-ists struggle to explain qualitative variation in 
the reality at levels below the Cosmos, including the apparently distinct myriad objects 
and humans that constitute the relata of our everyday interactions. Middleists have no 
such problems, or at least not the same ones: since the middle level is the most 
fundamental, there is no question about how it exists or whether it has explanatory power. 
A version of middleism might also vindicate the reality of social categories, moral 
properties, and other entities that struggle for ontological respect.  
 Mutatis mutandis for the causal power of everyday objects. Some top-ist and 
bottom-ist views are committed to the claim that the only real entities are the fundamental 
ones. Implicitly or explicitly, denying reality to all but the most fundamental things also 
denies causal power to all but the most fundamental things. Thus the priority monist, for 
example, must hold that only the whole Cosmos is a cause of anything at all. Even the 
most extreme sort of middleist—the one who denies existence to all but the middle level-
-has no such problem. For she can easily commit to and explain the causal powers of 
everyday objects: since they are the fundamentalia, they are the causes. 
 More generally, anti-foundationalists and foundationalists alike run into trouble 
with the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), the “rationalist” principle roughly 
according to which everything that exists must have a reason, explanation, cause, or 
ground. Anti-foundationalists face the challenge of explaining whence ultimate being 
arises if reality interminably ascends or descends. Apparent problems arise for the anti-
foundationalist when an ascending or descending chain of grounding facts fails to supply 
a basic reason for its own existence. Fine, for example, writes:  
 “[…] there is still a plausible demand on ground or explanation that we are unable 
to evade. For given a truth that stands in need of explanation, one naturally 
supposes that it should have a ‘completely satisfactory’ explanation, one that does 
not involve cycles and terminates in truths that do not stand in need of 
explanation” (2010, p. 105).  
 
Schaffer echoes this worry: 
 
 “There must be a ground of being. If one thing exists only in virtue of another, 
 then there must be something from which the reality of the derivative entities 
 ultimately derives.” (2010, p. 37) 
 
The anti-foundationalist must contend with the worry that Being is a victim of endless 
buck-passing, ontologically and explanatorily. In Schaffer’s words (2010), “Being would 
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be infinitely deferred, never achieved.” Such a concern drives many into the arms of 
foundationalism.19  
 Nevertheless, foundationalism also offends the PSR by accepting a metaphysical 
basis of reality for which there is no explanation. Being is not in danger of infinite 
deferral, since the buck stops with the most fundamental things. But the explanatory 
primitiveness of fundamentalia runs contrary to the doctrine that everything has an 
explanation. 
  I don’t pretend that the middleist has immensely more satisfying answers to these 
worries than top-ists and bottom-ists, but she is certainly no worse off than her 
competitors. If the rationalist demands an answer to the question: why do the 
fundamentalia exist?, there is no answer to this question available to top-ists and bottom-
ists that is not available to the middleist. That the middle level is the primitive one 
doesn’t pose a greater mystery or explanatory burden than the primitiveness of other 
levels. And if the fundamentalia exist ex nihilo, the level at which they exist doesn’t 
matter.   
 Given that any foundationalist metaphysics will run into problems with an 
unrestricted Principle of Sufficient Reason, one plausible approach is to weaken the 
relevant formulation of the PSR to which foundationalist theories must adhere. A 
weakened PSR formulation grants principled exceptions to certain facts or things, holding 
that these facts or things do not call out for explanation. In pursuing this kind of strategy, 
the central question then becomes where and when to allow for such exceptions.  
 The answer to this question will be a controversial matter, and a variety of 
different approaches are appealing.20 But if any level has readily available reasons for its 
own existence, and is thus the locus of a principled PSR exception, the middle level is a 
strong candidate. Middle-level objects are perceptually and intuitively given. They have 
rich essences that are more epistemically available to us than those of top-most-level or 
bottom-most-level things.21 Some middle level things are conscious. Middle level things 
are apt for evolutionary and teleological stories about their existence. Admittedly, these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Bliss (ms) suggests that many foundationalist arguments implicitly appeal to the PSR.   20	  Dasgupta (2015), for example, holds that essentialist facts are the best candidates for explanatorily 
autonomous facts. 21	  E.g., it is easier to discern the essence of a table than that of a particle. 
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are not grounding or fundamentality-based explanations. But the availability of these 
sorts of explanations for the existence of the middle level, compared with the mystery 
attached to the existence of the bottom and top levels, accords an extra advantage to 
middleism with respect to the Principle of Sufficient Reason.  
 Now, one might defend alternative frameworks as advantageous in the same 
ways. Aristotle’s metaphysics, for example, accords the most explanatory power to the 
top level. The top level is a living thing, apt for teleological explanation, and is 
conscious, on some interpretations.22 Presumably, the overall implausibility of such a 
view would be enough to speak against it. Adherence to a formulation of the PSR is but 
one dimension of theory choice. Weakening the PSR at least allows for a variety of views 
that adhere to it. Middleism, I claim, is at least as strong a contender as the reasonable 
alternatives, and certainly more than traditional Aristotelianism. For my purposes, this is 
good enough: it gives middleism a seat at the table. Which view wins overall is an 
independent matter. 
  Finally, the middleist has an advantage insofar as she can accept the simultaneous 
possibilities of the world being both gunky (in which everything has a proper part) and 
junky (in which everything is a proper part of something). The world could infinitely 
ascend upwards from the middle level and downwards from the middle level, and the 
middle level would explain all of the matter in both directions. If Middle Fundamentality 
and Metaphysical Foundationalism are true, even infinitely ascending and descending 
chains of being have a reason for existence provided by the middle level.23 
 
5. Conclusion 
 The view that a middle level could be the most fundamental level has been widely 
ignored in the Great Fundamentality Wars. Having examined the methodological, 
metaphysical, and intuitive strikes against the view, middleism does not seem to be much 
worse off than prevailing packages of top-ist and bottom-ist views in the fundamentality 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Thanks to a very helpful referee for pointing this out. 23	  Schwarz (2016) agrees, writing: “Reality might be infinitely divisible, but grounding chains nevertheless 
terminate, radiating inwards towards the familiar macroscopic objects. This kind of view might be 
defensible, but it is counterintuitive and would require independent motivation. Since I am not currently 
aware of it having any defenders, I set it aside here.” This view is similar to the one I aim to make 
plausible, though I hold that grounding chains radiate outwards. 
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literature. There is no reason not to treat it as a viable metaphysical option. Though such 
reasons might be discovered, to fail to further explore middleism is to neglect a 
promising avenue of metaphysical explanation.24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Thanks to Fatema Amijee, Holly Andersen, Daniel Nolan, Alex Skiles, Peter van Inwagen, an 
anonymous referee, and audiences at the PSR Workshop at Simon Fraser University, the Notre Dame 
Metaphysics Reading Group, the University of St. Andrews, the University of Connecticut, and CUNY-
Graduate Center for feedback on this paper. 
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